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67 
THE LIMITS OF PERMISSIBLE 
JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN SPEECH 
IN NEW YORK 
HON. VITO M. DESTEFANO† 
INTRODUCTION 
In December 2018, New York’s Advisory Committee on 
Judicial Ethics (“ACJE”), which I proudly served on for ten years, 
issued Opinion 17-28, concerning an inquiry by a judicial candi-
date as to whether he or she could respond to a candidate 
questionnaire prepared by the New York State Right to Life 
Committee (“RTL questionnaire”).1  In the RTL questionnaire, 
the candidate is asked a series of questions concerning the 
candidate’s personal beliefs on abortion, the beginning of life, Roe 
v. Wade,2 the definition of personhood, the New York and United 
States Constitutions, and so on.  Each question asking for the 
candidate’s personal beliefs is preceded by a prefatory acknowl-
edgment of “the judicial obligation to follow binding precedents of 
higher courts and applicable constitutional and statutory 
provisions, to honor stare decisis, and to decide any future case 
based on the law and facts of that case.”3 
Concluding that the RTL questionnaire, “when viewed as a 
whole, is clearly designed to elicit a series of implied pledges, 
promises, and commitments, touching on a wide variety of closely 
interrelated issues that may come before judges at every level of  
 
 
† Hon. Vito M. DeStefano is a Supreme Court Justice, former member of the 
Advisory Committee on Judicial Ethics and the Judicial Campaign Ethics Center 
(JCEC) subcommittee thereof, and member of the NYSBA Committee on Standards 
of Attorney Conduct (COSAC). In addition, Justice DeStefano teaches Professional 
Responsibility and New York Civil Practice at St. John’s University School of Law. 
1 N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Jud. Ethics, Op. 17-28 (Dec. 11, 2018), 
https://www.nycourts.gov/ipjudicialethicsopinions/17-28.htm [https://perma.cc/56AC-
UMLY]. 
2 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
3 Id. (quoting State Right to Life Comm. Jud. Candidate Questionnaire from 
N.Y. State Right to Life Comm., Inc., to N.Y. Judicial Candidates at *1–4 [herein-
after Questionnaire] (on file with author)). 
68 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:67   
the judiciary” and that “a candidate’s impartiality” could “ ‘reason-
ably be questioned’ in a wide variety of cases . . . if he/she agreed 
to the bold-faced statements on the questionnaire,”4 the candi-
date was advised to decline responding to it.  As I strongly 
disagree with the ACJE’s opinion, I write this Article to express 
my personal views on the subject.  Let me emphasize that this 
Article reflects my attempt to engage in a reasoned analysis of an 
admittedly difficult topic which, in my opinion, has not been 
sufficiently explored or discussed by academics, ethics commit-
tees, or judges since the Supreme Court of the United States 
decided Republican Party of Minnesota v. White (occasionally 
abbreviated herein as “White”).5 
State ethics advisory panels and disciplinary bodies in New 
York and elsewhere have struggled with the contours of permis-
sible judicial campaign speech following White, which invalidated 
Minnesota’s “announce clause” that prohibited judicial candi-
dates from “announcing their views on ‘disputed legal or political 
issues.’ ”6  However, a review of the opinions of advisory commit-
tees in states such as Arizona, Michigan, Nevada, Tennessee, 
Pennsylvania, and Georgia7 concerning candidate questionnaires 
that seek to elicit candidates’ personal opinions on controversial 
or disputed legal or political issues reveals no general prohibition 
against providing responses.  There are, instead, restrictions 
against furnishing answers that appear to bind the candidates 
upon assuming judicial office or requiring candidates to give 
assurances about “keep[ing] an open mind” and carrying out 
judicial duties “faithfully and impartially.”8 
 
4 Id. (quoting 22 N.Y. COMP. RULES & REGS § 100.3(E)(1) (2020)).  
5 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
6 Id. at 768, 788 (quoting MINN. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) 
(2000)). 
7 The judicial ethics canons in Pennsylvania and Georgia were amended to 
permit responses to questionnaires. See PA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. 11 
(2014); GA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. 3 (2016). In 2006, the Kansas Judicial 
Ethics Advisory Panel advised that a candidate could not answer a questionnaire 
which sought the judge’s personal opinions on a variety of controversial topics, 
including the rights of an unborn child, the death penalty, pornography, the right to 
define marriage, etc. Kan. Jud. Ethics Advisory Panel, Jud. Ethics Op. JE 139 (Apr. 
17, 2006). However, the Kansas Commission on Judicial Qualifications rejected the 
Panel’s conclusion inasmuch as “judges and judicial candidates are allowed to 
publicly announce their views on legal, political, or other issues.” Kan. Jud. Rev. v. 
Stout, 196 P.3d 1162, 1173–74 (Kan. 2008). 
8 PA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. 11 (2014); GA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT R. 4.2 
cmt. 3 (2016); see also Stout, 196 P.3d at 1176. 
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Interestingly, in 1996, several years prior to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in White, New York eliminated its announce 
clause over concerns that it was unconstitutional.9 
In light of the White decision, and considering the relevant 
rules, court decisions, and Judicial Conduct determinations and 
opinions, it is my opinion that a candidate can ethically answer 
the RTL questionnaire.  
I.  SUMMARY OF REPUBLICAN PARTY OF MINNESOTA V. WHITE 
In 1996, Gregory Wersal sought election as associate justice 
of the Minnesota Supreme Court.10  While campaigning, he dis-
tributed materials that criticized Minnesota Supreme Court 
decisions on controversial issues like “crime, welfare, and 
abortion.”11  A complaint was filed against Wersal by the Office of 
Lawyers Professional Responsibility, an office under the direction 
of the Minnesota Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board, 
which “investigates and prosecutes ethical violations of lawyer 
candidates for judicial office.”12  The Lawyers Board eventually 
dismissed the complaint.13  In regard to whether Wersal’s cam-
paign materials violated the announce clause, the Board expressed 
that it had doubts as to the clause’s constitutionality.14  
Nevertheless, Wersal withdrew from the election, fearing that his 
legal career would be in jeopardy if he received any additional 
ethical complaints.15  
In 1998, Wersal, again a candidate for election to judicial 
office, “sought an advisory opinion from the Lawyers Board” as to 
“whether it planned to enforce the announce clause.”16  In re-
sponse, the Lawyers Board stated that although it had 
 
9 N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N GOV’T ETHICS COMM., FIRST AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS 
FOR JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS: THE IMPACT OF REPUBLICAN PARTY OF MINNESOTA V. 
WHITE ON THE NEW YORK STATE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 5 (2004), 
https://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/WHITEREPORTDRAFT12304.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
5X3R-GQ4Y]. Prior to the elimination of the announce clause in New York, Canon 
7(b)(1)(c) of the Code of Judicial Conduct read as follows: a judicial candidate “should 
not make pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and 
impartial performance of the duties of the office [or] announce his views on disputed 
legal or political issues . . . .” New Code of Judicial Conduct is Adopted by the 
American Bar Association, 58 A.B.A. J. 1207, 1212 (1972). 
10 White, 536 U.S. at 768. 
11 Id.  
12 Id. at 768–69. 
13 Id. at 769. 
14 Id.  
15 Id.  
16 Id.  
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“significant doubts” about the clause’s constitutionality, it could 
not answer his question absent a list of the specific announce-
ments he intended to make.17 
Wersal and other plaintiffs, including the Republican Party 
of Minnesota, brought suit in federal district court, seeking an 
injunction against the enforcement of the announce clause, as 
well as a declaration that the clause violated the First Amend-
ment on its face.18  To advance this claim, Wersal argued that “he 
was forced to refrain from announcing his views on disputed 
issues” while campaigning, even in response to questioning, “out 
of concern” that he might violate the announce clause.19  The 
district court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment, 
concluding: 
the State had compelling interests in maintaining the actual 
and apparent integrity and independence of the judiciary 
and . . . the restrictions on candidates’ political activity and fund 
solicitation were narrowly tailored to serve those interests.  It also 
upheld the provisions against vagueness and equal protection 
challenges.  In its analysis of the announce clause, the court 
determined that the critical issue was whether the provision 
was narrowly tailored to serve the State’s interest in main-
taining the integrity and independence of the judiciary.  The 
district court construed the clause to reach only the discussion of 
issues likely to come before the court, having considered that the 
Judicial Board had argued for a narrow interpretation of the 
clause and that the Minnesota Supreme Court, when possible, 
construes laws to prohibit their application to constitutionally 
protected expression.  The court then concluded that the pro-
vision [with the limited construction] did not offend the First 
Amendment.20  
The Eighth Circuit affirmed, with one judge dissenting, 
agreeing with the clause’s limited construction and holding that 
the clause also permitted “general discussions of case law” and 
“judicial philosophy.”21 
The United States Supreme Court reversed, initially noting 
and rejecting the “limitations . . . placed upon the scope of the 
 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 769–70. 
19 Id. at 770. 
20 Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 860–61 (8th Cir. 2001) 
(emphasis added) (citations omitted), rev’d sub nom. Republican Party of Minn. v. 
White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
21 Id. at 882, 885. 
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announce clause” inasmuch as they prohibited “a judicial candi-
date from stating his views on any specific nonfanciful legal 
question within the province of the court for which he is running, 
except in the context of discussing past decisions—and in [that] 
context as well, if he expresses the view that he is not bound by 
stare decisis.”22 
The Court then examined the concept of impartiality—
identified by the State as a compelling state interest served by 
the announce clause—and determined that the announce clause 
did not survive a strict scrutiny analysis, even assuming that 
impartiality, howsoever it was defined, was a compelling state 
interest: 
One meaning of “impartiality” in the judicial context—and 
of course its root meaning—is the lack of bias for or against 
either party to the proceeding.  Impartiality in this sense as-
sures equal application of the law.  That is, it guarantees a party 
that the judge who hears his case will apply the law to him in 
the same way he applies it to any other party.  This is the trad-
itional sense in which the term is used. . . . 
We think it plain that the announce clause is not narrowly 
tailored to serve impartiality (or the appearance of impartiality) 
in this sense.  Indeed, the clause is barely tailored to serve that 
interest at all, inasmuch as it does not restrict speech for or 
against particular parties, but rather speech for or against 
particular issues.  To be sure, when a case arises that turns on a 
legal issue on which the judge (as a candidate) had taken a 
particular stand, the party taking the opposite stand is likely to 
lose.  But not because of any bias against that party, or favorit-
ism toward the other party.  Any party taking that position is 
just as likely to lose.  The judge is applying the law (as he sees 
it) evenhandedly. 
* * * 
It is perhaps possible to use the term “impartiality” in the 
judicial context . . . to mean lack of preconception in favor of or 
against a particular legal view.  This sort of impartiality would 
be concerned, not with guaranteeing litigants equal application 
of the law, but rather with guaranteeing them an equal chance 
to persuade the court on the legal points in their case.  Impar-
tiality in this sense may well be an interest served by the 
announce clause, but it is not a compelling state interest, as 
strict scrutiny requires.  A judge’s lack of predisposition regard-
ing the relevant legal issues in a case has never been thought a 
 
22 White, 536 U.S. at 771, 773 (italics omitted). 
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necessary component of equal justice, and with good reason.  
For one thing, it is virtually impossible to find a judge who does 
not have preconceptions about the law. . . .  Indeed, even if it 
were possible to select judges who did not have preconceived 
views on legal issues, it would hardly be desirable to do so.  
“Proof that a Justice’s mind at the time he joined the Court was 
a complete tabula rasa in the area of constitutional adjudication 
would be evidence of lack of qualification, not lack of bias.”  The 
Minnesota Constitution positively forbids the selection to courts 
of general jurisdiction of judges who are impartial in the sense 
of having no views on the law.  And since avoiding judicial pre-
conceptions on legal issues is neither possible nor desirable, pre-
tending otherwise by attempting to preserve the “appearance” of 
that type of impartiality can hardly be a compelling state 
interest either. 
* * * 
A third possible meaning of “impartiality” (again not a 
common one) might be described as open-mindedness.  This qual-
ity in a judge demands, not that he have no preconceptions on 
legal issues, but that he be willing to consider views that oppose 
his preconceptions, and remain open to persuasion, when the 
issues arise in a pending case.  This sort of impartiality seeks to 
guarantee each litigant, not an equal chance to win the legal 
points in the case, but at least some chance of doing so.  It may 
well be that impartiality in this sense, and the appearance of it, 
are desirable in the judiciary, but we need not pursue that 
inquiry, since we do not believe the Minnesota Supreme Court 
adopted the announce clause for that purpose. 
Respondents argue that the announce clause serves the 
interest in openmindedness, or at least in the appearance of 
openmindedness, because it relieves a judge from pressure to 
rule a certain way in order to maintain consistency with state-
ments the judge has previously made.  The problem is, however, 
that statements in election campaigns are such an infinitesimal 
portion of the public commitments to legal positions that judges 
(or judges-to-be) undertake, that this object of the prohibition is 
implausible.  Before they arrive on the bench (whether by elec-
tion or otherwise) judges have often committed themselves on 
legal issues that they must later rule upon.  More common still 
is a judge’s confronting a legal issue on which he has expressed 
an opinion while on the bench.  Most frequently, of course, that 
prior expression will have occurred in ruling on an earlier case.  
But judges often state their views on disputed legal issues 
outside the context of adjudication—in classes that they 
conduct, and in books and speeches.  Like the ABA Codes of 
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Judicial Conduct, the Minnesota Code not only permits but en-
courages this.  That is quite incompatible with the notion that 
the need for open-mindedness (or for the appearance of open-
mindedness) lies behind the prohibition at issue here. 
The short of the matter is this: In Minnesota, a candidate 
for judicial office may not say “I think it is constitutional for the 
legislature to prohibit same-sex marriages.”  He may say the 
very same thing, however, up until the very day before he 
declares himself a candidate, and may say it repeatedly (until 
litigation is pending) after he is elected.  As a means of pursuing 
the objective of open-mindedness that respondents now artic-
ulate, the announce clause is so woefully underinclusive as to 
render belief in that purpose a challenge to the credulous. 
 Justice Stevens asserts that statements made in an 
election campaign pose a special threat to open-mindedness 
because the candidate, when elected judge, will have a 
particular reluctance to contradict them.  That might be plausi-
ble, perhaps, with regard to campaign promises.  A candidate 
who says “If elected, I will vote to uphold the legislature’s power 
to prohibit same-sex marriages” will positively be breaking his 
word if he does not do so (although one would be naive not to 
recognize that campaign promises are—by long democratic 
tradition—the least binding form of human commitment).  But, 
as noted earlier, the Minnesota Supreme Court has adopted a 
separate prohibition on campaign “pledges or promises,” which 
is not challenged here.  The proposition that judges feel signifi-
cantly greater compulsion, or appear to feel significantly greater 
compulsion, to maintain consistency with nonpromissory state-
ments made during a judicial campaign than with such 
statements made before or after the campaign is not self-
evidently true.  It seems to us quite likely, in fact, that in many 
cases the opposite is true.  We doubt, for example, that a mere 
statement of position enunciated during the pendency of an 
election will be regarded by a judge as more binding—or as 
more likely to subject him to popular disfavor if reconsidered—
than a carefully considered holding that the judge set forth in 
an earlier opinion denying some individual’s claim to justice.  In 
any event, it suffices to say that respondents have not carried 
the burden imposed by our strict-scrutiny test to establish this 
proposition (that campaign statements are uniquely destructive 
of open-mindedness) on which the validity of the announce 
clause rests. 
Moreover, the notion that the special context of 
electioneering justifies an abridgment of the right to speak out 
on disputed issues sets our First Amendment jurisprudence on 
its head.  “[D]ebate on the qualifications of candidates” is “at the 
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core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment free-
doms,” not at the edges. . . .  “It is simply not the function of 
government to select which issues are worth discussing or 
debating in the course of a political campaign.”  We have never 
allowed the government to prohibit candidates from communi-
cating relevant information to voters during an election.23 
In a footnote, the majority acknowledged that: 
[T]he announce clause “serves the State’s interest in maintain-
ing both the appearance of [a] form of impartiality [in regard to 
parties to a proceeding] and its actuality.”  . . . Some of the 
speech prohibited by the announce clause may well exhibit a 
bias against parties—including Justice Stevens’s example of an 
election speech stressing the candidate’s unbroken record of 
affirming convictions for rape.  That is why we are careful to say 
that the announce clause is “barely tailored to serve that 
interest” . . .  The question under our strict scrutiny test, how-
ever, is not whether the announce clause serves this interest at 
all, but whether it is narrowly tailored to serve this interest.  It 
is not.24 
In dissent, Justice Ginsberg, after discussing the undisputed 
and continuing vitality of Minnesota’s “[no] pledges and promises 
clause,” made the following observations: 
The constitutionality of the pledges or promises clause is 
thus amply supported; the provision not only advances due 
process of law for litigants in Minnesota courts, it also rein-
forces the authority of the Minnesota judiciary by promoting 
public confidence in the State’s judges.  The Announce Clause, 
however, is equally vital to achieving these compelling ends, for 
without it, the pledges or promises provision would be feeble, an 
arid form, a matter of no real importance. 
 
23 Id. at 775–82 (emphasis omitted) (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted) (first 
quoting Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 835 (1972) (memorandum opinion); then 
quoting Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 222–23 (1989); and 
then quoting Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60 (1982)). 
24 Id. at 777 n.7 (citations omitted) (first quoting id. at 801 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting); and then quoting id. at 776 (majority opinion)). In his concurring 
opinion, Justice Kennedy observed that Minnesota  
may adopt recusal standards more rigorous than due process requires, and 
censure judges who violate these standards. What Minnesota may not do, 
however, is censor what the people hear as they undertake to decide for 
themselves which candidate is most likely to be an exemplary judicial 
officer. Deciding the relevance of candidate speech is the right of the voters, 
not the State.  
Id. at 794 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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 Uncoupled from the Announce Clause, the ban on pledges 
or promises is easily circumvented.  By prefacing a campaign 
commitment with the caveat, “although I cannot promise any-
thing,” or by simply avoiding the language of promises or 
pledges altogether, a candidate could declare with impunity how 
she would decide specific issues.  Semantic sanitizing of the can-
didate’s commitment would not, however, diminish its pernicious 
effects on actual and perceived judicial impartiality.  To use the 
Court’s example, a candidate who campaigns by saying, “If 
elected, I will vote to uphold the legislature’s power to prohibit 
same-sex marriages” will feel scarcely more pressure to honor 
that statement than the candidate who stands behind a podium 
and tells a throng of cheering supporters: “I think it is constitu-
tional for the legislature to prohibit same-sex marriages.”  Made 
during a campaign, both statements contemplate a quid pro quo 
between candidate and voter.  Both effectively “bind [the candi-
date] to maintain that position after election.”  And both convey 
the impression of a candidate prejudging an issue to win votes.  
Contrary to the Court’s assertion, the “nonpromissory” state-
ment averts none of the dangers posed by the “promissory” one. 
By targeting statements that do not technically constitute 
pledges or promises but nevertheless “publicly mak[e] known 
how [the candidate] would decide” legal issues, the Announce 
Clause prevents this end run around the letter and spirit of its 
companion provision.  No less than the pledges or promises clause 
itself, the Announce Clause is an indispensable part of Minne-
sota’s effort to maintain the health of its judiciary, and is 
therefore constitutional for the same reasons.25 
II.  AFTER REPUBLICAN PARTY OF MINNESOTA V. WHITE 
The United States Supreme Court’s decision in White has 
spurred significant commentary and controversy among, inter 
alia, courts, disciplinary bodies, and scholars attempting to 
balance “the competing goals of informed voter decision making, 
vigorous competition, and judicial impartiality that together 
frame the debate over the regulation of judicial election cam-
paigns.”26  For the most part, as noted, “state courts have revised 
their canons, including provisions not at issue in White, to make 
them less restrictive. . . .  [But others] have rejected First Amend-
 
25 Id. at 819–21 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted) 
(first quoting id. at 780 (majority opinion); then quoting id. at 779; then quoting id. 
at 770; and then quoting Kelly, 247 F.3d at 881–82).  
26 Richard Briffault, Judicial Campaign Codes After Republican Party of 
Minnesota v. White, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 181, 187 (2004). 
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ment challenges to the restrictions on judicial campaign and 
partisan political activities that the canons impose.”27  
In New York, the Court of Appeals has applied the holding of 
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White narrowly, rejecting con-
stitutional attacks on other, related canons.28  An excellent sum-
mary of the Court of Appeals’ treatment of permissible and 
impermissible campaign statements is set forth in a 2013 law 
review article.29  The aforementioned law review article notes 
that: 
White had a nationwide impact on state judicial conduct 
codes. . . .  In the aftermath of White, the New York Court of Ap-
peals decided Matter of Shanley.  The petitioner sought review 
of a decision of the New York State Commission on Judicial 
Conduct (“Commission”) concerning “campaign literature in 
which she [had] identified herself as a ‘Law and order 
Candidate.’ ” 
“In the Commission’s view, the phrase created the appear-
ance that petitioner would favor the prosecution, and amounted 
to an impermissible pledge as to how she would decide cases.”  
According to widely held perceptions, “the phrase promises 
stern treatment of criminal defendants.”  The Court of Appeals 
disagreed with the result, finding that the phrase did not 
compromise judicial impartiality.  “ ‘Law and order’ is a phrase 
widely and indiscriminately used in everyday parlance and 
election campaigns.  We decline to treat it as a ‘commit[ment]’ or a 
‘pledge[ ] or promise[ ] of conduct in office.’ ” 
The next year the Court of Appeals decided Matter of 
Watson.  In the course of his campaign for judicial office, William 
Watson sent a letter to law enforcement personnel asking them 
to “put a real prosecutor on the bench.”  Watson indicated in a 
newspaper advertisement that “he had ‘proven experience in the 
war against crime.’ ”  Watson also made a statement to a report-
er indicating that he would reduce court caseloads by cracking 
down on crime, causing criminals to go elsewhere. 
 The Court of Appeals identified tension with White, finding 
the pledges or promises clause at issue in the case “sufficiently 
circumscribed” to withstand First Amendment scrutiny.  The 
 
27 Id. at 183 (footnotes omitted).  
28 See N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Jud. Ethics, Op. 15-188 (Jan. 28, 2016), 
https://www.nycourts.gov/ipjudicialethicsopinions/15-188.htm [https://perma.cc/K95M-
FYDY] (“New York State appellate courts have considered, and rejected, claims that 
certain judicial conduct rules prohibiting partisan political activity impermissibly 
restrict a judge’s freedom of speech . . . or are unconstitutionally vague.”). 
29 Noah Hertz-Bunzl, Pledge, Promise, or Commit: New York’s Tenuous Limi-
tations on Judicial Campaign Speech, 29 TOURO L. REV. 569, 569 (2013). 
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clause is limited because it “precludes only those statements of 
intention that single out a party or class of litigants for special 
treatment” or convey a candidate will behave inconsistently 
with their judicial duties, leaving permissible “most statements 
identifying a point of view.” 
[S]tatements that merely express a viewpoint do not 
amount to promises of future conduct.  On the other hand, 
candidates need not preface campaign statements with the 
phrase “I promise” before their remarks may reasonably be 
interpreted by the public as a pledge to act or rule in a 
particular way if elected.  A candidate’s statements must be 
reviewed in their totality and in the context of the cam-
paign as a whole to determine whether the candidate has 
unequivocally articulated a pledge or promise of future 
conduct . . . . 
Here, Watson violated this rule by expressing a bias in favor of 
the police and implying he would use his powers to keep certain 
kinds of defendants out of the city, and did so repeatedly 
throughout the campaign. 
In 2009, the Commission considered charges against [a 
judge] stemming from her election campaign for New York City 
Civil Court.  [In her campaign, the judge] had released litera-
ture advertising a planned lecture that stated, “[she] and 
Veteran Tenant Attorney Steven DeCastro will show you how 
to stick up for your rights, beat your landlord, . . . and win in 
court!” 
The Commission identified violations of the pledges, prom-
ises, and commitments clauses. 
[The candidate’s] literature may have given prospective 
voters the impression that she would favor tenants over 
landlords in housing matters, which are often the subject of 
Civil Court proceedings.  By distributing such literature, 
which appeared to commit herself with respect to issues 
likely to come before her court, she compromised her 
impartiality. 
* * * 
In 2010, the Commission considered written complaints 
against Rensselaer County Supreme Court Justice Patrick J. 
McGrath for a letter he sent during his campaign to pistol permit 
holders.  The text of the letter stated the following: 
As your County Judge for the past 14 years, I have been 
responsible for all pistol permits in Rensselaer County.  My  
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pistol permit is very important to me as I know yours is to 
you. . . . 
. . . . 
As Supreme Court Justice . . . I will still be responsible 
for all pistol permits in Rensselaer County. 
The Commission found that the statements conveyed bias to 
favor pistol permit holders and their interests, reinforcing an 
implied promise that he would look after their interests and 
thus violated the rule against improper pledges, promises, and 
commitments.  “Campaign statements that single out a particular 
class of litigants for special treatment are inconsistent with 
judicial impartiality and the appearance of impartiality . . . .” 
The Commission made a number of decisions on similar 
issues prior to White.  In the following three instances, the Com-
mission found a violation of the “pledges and promises” and 
“commit or appear to commit” clauses.  Matter of Birnbaum in-
volved a brochure that “asserted that voters had a ‘clear choice’ 
between respondent . . . a tenant, and his opponent . . . a land-
lord.”  The “literature gave the unmistakable impression that he 
would favor tenants over landlords in housing matters.” 
Matter of Hafner, Jr. involved literature “that stated: ‘Are 
you tired of seeing career criminals get a ‘slap’ on the wrist?  So 
am I’ ” and the phrase, referring to an opponent, that “[s]oft 
judges make hard criminals!”  The literature implied respon-
dent “would deal harshly with all such defendants, rather than 
judge the merits of individual cases.”  Matter of LaCava in-
volved a letter sent to Right-to-Life Party members in which the 
candidate “asserted his ‘commitment to the sanctity of life from 
the moment of conception’ ” and an interview with a reporter in 
which the candidate stated that abortion is murder.  This state-
ment “created the appearance” that LaCava “might not follow 
constitutional and statutory law if called upon to do so.”30 
 
30 Id. at 572–76 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted) (first quoting In re 
Shanley, 98 N.Y.2d 310, 311–13 (2002) (per curiam); then quoting In re Watson, 100 
N.Y.2d 290, 296, 298, 303 (2003) (per curiam); then quoting In re Chan (N.Y. 
Comm’n Jud. Conduct Nov. 17, 2009), 2009 WL 4929370, at *2–3; then quoting In re 
McGrath (N.Y. Comm’n Jud. Conduct Feb. 5, 2010), 2010 WL 597261, at *1, *3; then 
quoting In re Birnbaum (N.Y. Comm’n Jud. Conduct Sept. 29, 1997), 1997 WL 
640687, at *1–2; then quoting In re Hafner (N.Y. Comm’n Jud. Conduct Dec. 29, 
2000), 2000 WL 33172938, at *1–2; and then quoting In re La Cava (N.Y. Comm’n 
Jud. Conduct Sept. 16, 1999), 1999 WL 994135, at *1–2). The article posits that 
Ultimately the key distinction in New York is that a statement is 
unlawful when it favors a single class of litigants. Under this rubric, 
William Watson and Walter Hafner violated the rule by favoring law 
enforcement over criminal defendants. [The New York City Civil Court 
candidate] and Arthur Birnbaum violated the rule by favoring tenants over 
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The article then summarized the status of pledge, promise, 
or commit clauses across the nation since White: 
The vast majority of states that have judicial elections have 
some form of a pledge, promise, or commit clause in their 
canons of judicial conduct.  The constitutionality of such clauses 
after White has been the subject of litigation in other states.  
The Supreme Court of Florida has upheld the clauses.  Other 
courts have upheld the clauses with narrow constructions.  A 
number of federal district courts have found the provisions to be 
unconstitutional, on their face or as applied.  Some federal 
appellate courts have rejected challenges to the clauses based 
on ripeness or standing grounds.  The general consensus among 
the scholarship is that [even] the promises clauses are on shaky 
ground after White.31 
The Court of Appeals also upheld the political activity canons 
in Matter of Raab.  There, the court distinguished between a can-
didate’s activities on his own behalf, which were permissible, and 
activities on behalf of other candidates, which were not, and 
otherwise found the canons narrowly tailored to preserve the 
impartiality and integrity of the judiciary.32 
In a 2006 article analyzing the impact of White, Robert 
Tembeckjian, Administrator and Counsel to New York’s Judicial 
Conduct Commission, suggested that statements which are per-
missible during a campaign may later require disqualification 
and that the failure to disqualify might lead to discipline.33  He 
also reiterated Justice Ginsburg’s suggestion that the exclusion 
of explicit words of pledge or promise from a statement does not 
render an otherwise impermissible statement permissible: 
As the effects of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in 
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White take hold, and can-
didates for judicial office speak more freely, will judges more 
frequently be disqualified from hearing certain cases because 
their impartiality has been compromised by things they said on 
the campaign trail?  
* * * 
 
landlords. Patrick McGrath violated this rule by favoring the interests of 
gun-owners over the interests of non gun-owners. 
Id. at 582 (footnotes omitted). 
31 Id. at 578.  
32 100 N.Y.2d 305, 315–16 (2003).  
33 Robert H. Tembeckjian, Campaign Speech and the Administration of Justice, 
N.Y.L.J. (Nov. 29, 2006), https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/f2ed6214-ce77-
4f81-8a0a-5924c0765ff1/ (login required). 
80 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:67   
A related code provision, the “disqualification rule,” re-
quires a judge to recuse in any case where the judge’s 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including where 
the judge, while a candidate, made a public statement that 
commits, or appears to commit, the judge with respect to an 
issue in the proceeding, the controversy itself and, in some 
jurisdictions, the parties or a class of parties.  In his concurring 
opinion in White, Justice Anthony Kennedy noted that the 
states may adopt disqualification standards more rigorous than 
due process requires and may discipline judges who violate 
those standards.  
* * * 
What is really going on here is not so much a grand 
constitutional debate as an issue-driven political agenda.  Many 
of the post-White federal lawsuits challenging the code have 
been brought by Right-to-Life organizations, whose goal seems 
to be to loosen the constraints on judicial candidates so that a 
more ideologically pure group of candidates would be identified 
and elected.  In Alaska, where a lawsuit challenging the code 
has been commenced, the judicial council advised judicial 
candidates not to answer certain issue-driven questionnaires.  
The Alaska Right to Life organization then sent out a fund-
raising appeal stating, “Alaska Right to Life is in dire need of 
PAC funding to accomplish the goals of changing the makeup of 
the courts by removing bad judges.” 
What may be a “bad judge” to Alaska Right to Life is proba-
bly not what would be a “bad judge” to Alaska abortion rights 
advocates, but I would be offended by such tactics from either 
side of the abortion issue.  When Right to Life wins one, they 
simultaneously open the door to Pro-Choice groups using the 
same tactics to put their people on the bench.  What is good for 
one side will be good for the other.  It just won’t be good for 
public confidence in the integrity or impartiality of the judiciary 
or the administration of justice.  
* * * 
If a campaigning judge is permitted to make promises with 
respect to cases or controversies, will that judge’s impartiality 
reasonably be questioned should that case or controversy come 
before him or her on the bench?  In my view, depending on the 
specifics of the particular situation, the answer will increasingly 
be “yes,” and the judge will have to recuse.   
For example, I believe under White judicial candidates may 
say, “I have always believed life begins at conception.”  But I do 
not believe White permits candidates to say, “If an abortion case 
comes before me, I will rule in favor of the unborn child.”  Such 
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a statement would likely result in discipline under the “pledges 
or promises” clause.  Yet even if there were no such clause, this 
pledge-making candidate could not preside over an abortion 
rights case because, under the disqualification rule, he or she 
would have made a campaign statement that did or appeared to 
commit to a party or a result.  Substitute “pro-choice” for “right 
to-life” in this example, and you get the same awful result.34 
Other campaign statements may not violate the rules so 
clearly.  If that same candidate were to say, “I am right-to-life, 
and if an abortion case comes before me, you can count on me to 
do the right thing,” my work as a disciplinary enforcer would be 
set in motion.  Was this a disguised and prohibited “pledge” or 
“promise”? 
 If the present trend continues, and federal courts invali-
date the “pledges or promises” clause while affirming the 
disqualification rule, the Right-to-Life groups bringing suit will 
have created new work for disciplinary enforcers, work we do 
not want on an issue we would prefer were not there, but work 
we will be obliged to undertake.  We could not let judges off the 
hook for presiding over cases in which their impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned.  But our factual inquiry would be a 
complex and delicate balancing act as we try to find the truth 
without becoming the “thought police.”  And we would not be 
alone.  Appellate courts would increasingly be forced to rule on 
claims that a lower court ruling was tainted by the judge’s lack 
of impartiality, owing to pledges or promises made during the 
judge’s campaign.35 
 
34 In Mr. Tembeckjian’s hypothetical example, the candidate would, in any 
event, be guilty of violating multiple ethics rules: He promised/pledged a result; 
committed to a “case or controversy”; demonstrated bias in favor of a party; and 
suggested that he would not follow the law. Id. Clearly, therefore, the candidate, 
after election, would also be disqualified. Mr. Tembeckjian’s otherwise excellent 
article also asserts that disqualification would be required because the judge, while 
a candidate, “appeared to commit to a party or result.” Id. (emphasis added). Signifi-
cantly, the Rules governing the Conduct of Judges were amended in February 2006 
to delete the provision which precluded candidates from making “statements that 
commit or appear to commit the candidate with respect to cases, controversies or 
issues that are likely to come before the court . . . .” 22 N.Y. COMP. RULES & REGS. 
§ 100.5(A)(4)(d)(ii) (2006) (alterations omitted). Mr. Tembeckjian’s article was pub-
lished in November 2006. Tembeckjian, supra note 33. Although Mr. Tembeckjian’s 
statement is consistent with his earlier reference to Justice Kennedy’s assertion that 
recusal standards may be more rigorous than due process requires, any reliance on 
the “appear[s] to commit” language of a defunct rule is problematic. 
35 Tembeckjian, supra note 33 (footnote omitted). 
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III.  OPINIONS OF THE ACJE AFTER WHITE 
In Opinion 15-71 of the ACJE, the inquiring judge, a candidate 
for election/re-election, was invited by a non-profit advocacy 
group to participate in a screening process to be evaluated for the 
group’s endorsement in the upcoming election.36  Concerned about 
disclosing a position that might compromise the judge’s oath “to 
be ‘unbiased, fair and impartial,’ ”37 the inquirer sought advice 
from the committee, which responded as follows: 
[T]he Committee believes the inquiring judicial candidate may 
express his/her own personal views on matters related to 
abortion during the interview process with the organization in 
question, provided the candidate does not make pledges or 
promises of conduct in office inconsistent with the impartial 
performance of the adjudicative duties of office, or improper 
commitments regarding cases, controversies, or issues likely to 
come before the court.  If the inquiring candidate chooses to 
share his/her views on the subject of abortion in an interview 
with the advocacy organization, he/she should also make clear 
that he/she will decide all cases fairly and impartially and in 
accordance with governing law. 
The candidate also may not agree to any unacceptable “con-
ditions” to the endorsement or support, such as a request that the 
candidate decline endorsement by particular organizations or 
political parties, or a request to make a pledge or promise of 
conduct in office inconsistent with the impartial performance of 
adjudicative duties. 
Finally, it is noted that, if the inquiring candidate believes 
the organization is attempting to pressure him/her into making 
an improper pledge or promise, the candidate may, if he/she 
wishes, direct the organization’s attention to section 100.3(E)(1)(f), 
which would require disqualification in certain matters if the 
candidate acquiesced in the organization’s request.38 
The ACJE has also added cautionary notes to several opin-
ions decided prior to White, noting the absence of an announce 
clause in New York and indicating that candidates could not 
articulate their views on legal issues.39 
 




38 Id. (citations omitted); see 22 N.Y. COMP. RULES & REGS. § 100.3(E)(1)(f) (2020). 
39 See, e.g., N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Jud. Ethics, Op. 93-99 (Dec. 9, 1993), 
https://www.nycourts.gov/ipjudicialethicsopinions/93-99.htm [https://perma.cc/4Q56-
ED6Q] (candidate may not answer questions designed to elicit the candidate’s views 
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The ACJE opined that a judicial candidate could not “answer 
a political party’s questionnaire designed to elicit express and 
implied commitments that (a) are unrelated to the impartial 
performance of judicial duties and/or (b) would require him/her to 
engage in activities prohibited by the Rules Governing Judicial 
Conduct.”40  Some of the questions included: 
• “Will you pledge to fight any attempts to roll back the 
reproductive protections afforded women by Roe v. Wade?” 
• “Would you commit to supporting state funding for [P]lanned 
Parenthood services should the federal government no 
longer allow any federal dollars to be used for its health care 
services?  And would you vocally oppose any federal propos-
al that cuts federal funding for Planned Parenthood?” 
• “Will you oppose any attempts to limit [Social Security and 
Medicare] to reduce the federal deficit?” 
• “Will you fight back any attempts to repeal the [Affordable 
Care Act]?”41 
The Committee responded as follows: 
In general, a judicial candidate may personally participate 
in his/her own judicial campaign during the designated window 
period, subjection to limitations.  For example, the campaign 
must be conducted consistent with the judiciary’s impartiality, 
integrity and independence, and all campaign statements must 
be entirely truthful and not in any way misleading.  Also, a judi-
cial candidate may not make pledges or promises of conduct in 
office at odds with impartial performance of judicial duties nor 
 
or pledges on particular controversial issues or concerning whether the judge would 
accept the nomination of some other party); N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Jud. Ethics, Op. 
93-52 (Oct. 28, 1993), https://www.nycourts.gov/ipjudicialethicsopinions/93-52.htm 
[https://perma.cc/KL66-MAV8] (candidate may accept endorsement of Right to Life 
party but “should not . . . manifest an acceptance of the principles of the party in any 
other fashion”); N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Jud. Ethics, Op. 90-67 (June 7, 1990), 
https://www.nycourts.gov/ipjudicialethicsopinions/90-67.htm [https://perma.cc/M367-
C4H2] (a judge running for re-election may, during the campaign, refer to his or her 
previous decisions, and comment on an opponent’s qualifications, but may not 
comment on disputed legal or political issues). In some recent opinions, the 
committee has continued to cite to older opinions that pre-date White for the 
proposition that “accepting a party’s nomination ‘does not necessarily require 
acceptance of that party’s goals, positions, or platform.’ ” N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Jud. 
Ethics, Op. 14-113 (Sept. 4, 2014), https://www.nycourts.gov/ipjudicialethicsopinions/ 
14-113.htm [https://perma.cc/84ED-FDMC]. Inasmuch as candidates can announce 
their views, however, the importance of this statement is unclear.  
40 N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Jud. Ethics, Op. 18-95 (May 10, 2018), 
https://www.nycourts.gov/ipjudicialethicsopinions/18-95.htm [https://perma.cc/XZ9R-
8NFV]. 
41 Id. (second and third alterations in original). 
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make improper promises about controversies, cases, or issues 
likely to come before the court. 
Applying these principles, we have advised that a judicial 
candidate may not promise to set up and fund a legal scholar-
ship if elected, as this “is a pledge or promise entirely unrelated 
to the ‘faithful and impartial performance of judicial duties’ and 
thus impermissible.”  Nor may a candidate sign a political orga-
nization’s pledge to support and endorse all other candidates 
endorsed by the organization and to consult with it on any 
appointments when in public office.  We have also advised that 
a judicial candidate must not promise to abolish the lawful and 
accepted practice of plea bargaining in criminal cases in his/her 
court if elected. 
Here, too, we conclude that the candidate may not respond 
to this questionnaire as it seeks commitments that are incon-
sistent with and/or unrelated to the impartial performance of 
judicial duties.  We note the party’s questionnaire does not in any 
way acknowledge a judge’s obligation to “decide all cases fairly 
and impartially and in accordance with governing law” and does 
not invite candidates to assert any caveats when responding to 
its yes/no questions.42 
The opinion goes on to note “that the candidate, if elected or 
re-elected, would not be ethically permitted to fulfill many, or 
perhaps most, of the express and implied promises the question-
naire elicits.”43 
 
42 Id. (citations omitted) (first quoting N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Jud. Ethics, Op. 
03-28 (Aug. 12, 2004), https://www.nycourts.gov/ipjudicialethicsopinions/03-28_.htm 
[https://perma.cc/NK3V-REW5]; and then quoting N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Jud. 
Ethics, Op. 15-71 (June 11, 2015), https://www.nycourts.gov/ipjudicialethicsopinions/ 
15-71.htm [https://perma.cc/4LLB-BBRJ]). 
43 Id. (“For example, although a sitting judge may make recommendations to 
public and private fund-granting organizations on ‘projects and programs concerning 
the law, the legal system, and the administration of justice’ (22 NYCRR 
100.4(C)(3)(b)(iii)), he/she generally may not publicly support increased or continued 
funding for other purposes (compare e.g. Opinions 12-58 [appropriations for a fire 
company]; 03-38 [ballot proposition to secure funding for a library]; 00-33 [library 
bond proposition]; 95-02 [appropriations for a public library] with Opinions 18-08 
[appropriations for a problem-solving court]; 07-109 [bond measure for a new 
courthouse]). As another example, while a judge may be able to convey ‘facts 
personally known’ concerning ‘the fitness of a nominee under consideration for an 
appointive [federal] judgeship’ to the United States Senate Judiciary Committee 
(Opinion 93-22), a judge who publicly opposes a U.S. Supreme Court nominee based 
solely on the nominee’s views on abortion or other such controversial policy issues 
would likely be seen as engaging in partisan political activity (see 22 NYCRR 
100.5(A)(1) [a judge must not ‘directly or indirectly engage in any political activity’ 
except as expressly permitted]; cf. Opinion 17-38 [a judge may not call a Senate 
Committee to express an opinion on a pending federal executive branch appoint-
ment]). Further, while a judge has an ethical obligation to adjudicate cases and 
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IV.  THE TREATMENT OF SPEECH RESTRICTIONS ON  
CANDIDATES AS COMPARED WITH JUDGES 
In the course of undertaking this analysis, it occurred to me 
that I had routinely conflated the speech restrictions on judges 
with the speech restrictions on candidates.  Certainly, most of the 
rules applicable to judges who are not candidates are equally 
applicable to candidates, regardless of whether they are judges.44  
And some inquiring judges, who were not candidates for election 
or re-election, have challenged the speech restrictions contained 
within, or arising out of, the canons relying on White.45 
It will be remembered that White dealt with the validity of 
the announce clause, which was applicable only to candidates for 
judicial office.  However, the majority opinion suggested that under 
the Minnesota canons, the speech rights of judges not seeking 
election/re-election, were greater than the speech rights of can-
didates, precisely because the announce clause was applicable to 
the latter and not to the former, and that this caused an absurd 
result, to wit, that what the candidate could not properly 
announce the day prior to his election, he could properly 
announce the day after his election.46 
By parity of reasoning, in New York, where there is no 
announce clause, an argument could be made that subject to 
compliance with other rules, and accounting for any variations in 
the treatment of judges and candidates stemming from the 
difference in their positions, judicial versus non-judicial, judges 
and candidates should, under White, be treated similarly in their 
announcement of views.  Nevertheless, that has not been the case.  
In this regard, non-candidate judges in New York must avoid 
 
controversies that are properly before him/her, without being ‘swayed by partisan 
interests, public clamor or fear of criticism’ (22 NYCRR 100.3(B)(1)), the promise to 
fight for a particular side of a politically controversial issue is inconsistent with the 
role of a neutral arbiter and would insert the judge ‘unnecessarily into public 
controversy’ (Opinion 17-38). Thus, the questionnaire is also impermissible to the 
extent it purports to require the candidate to engage in activities prohibited by the 
Rules Governing Judicial Conduct.”). 
44 For purposes of clarity, “judges” here will be used to refer to judges who are 
not candidates for election or re-election and “candidates” will refer to judges and 
non-judge candidates for election or re-election. 
45 See, e.g., N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Jud. Ethics, Op. 15-188 (Jan. 28, 2016), 
https://www.nycourts.gov/ipjudicialethicsopinions/15-188.htm [https://perma.cc/K95M-
FYDY]; N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Jud. Ethics, Op. 16-85 (June 16, 2016), 
https://www.nycourts.gov/ipjudicialethicsopinions/16-85.htm [https://perma.cc/H4SS-
FPZX]. 
46 See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 779–80 (2002). 
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speaking on controversial issues; in effect, they are not permitted 
to announce their views.  
Irrespective of whether such a distinction is supportable in 
law and logic, it will be helpful to examine the specific rules from 
which the speech restrictions on judges and candidates derive.  
A. Speech Restrictions on Judges and Candidates in New York 
The following is a synopsis of the Rules of the Chief Admin-
istrator of the Courts which directly or indirectly imposes speech 
restrictions on judges and candidates:  
• Section 100.2, applicable to judges only, requires judges to 
“avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety” and 
to “act at all times in a manner that promotes public con-
fidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary” 
and “not lend the prestige of judicial office to ad-
vance . . . private interests . . . .”47 
• Section 100.3, applicable to judges only, requires judges: to 
“perform the duties of judicial office impartially and 
diligently,” “without bias or prejudice” or manifesting bias 
or prejudice; to refrain from commenting on “pending or 
impending” cases in the United States or its territories; 
“disqualify himself or herself” where “the judge has personal 
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts” or where the judge, 
either as candidate or judge, “made a pledge or prom-
ise . . . inconsistent with the impartial performance of . . . 
duties” or a “public statement . . . that commits the judge” 
with respect to an issue or the parties in a proceeding.48 
• Section 100.4, applicable to judges only, requires judges to 
conduct extra-judicial activities in a manner that minimizes 
the risk of conflict with judicial obligations so that judges 
are not to engage in such activities that “(1) cast reasonable 
doubt on the judge’s capacity to act impartially as a judge; 
(2) detract from the dignity of judicial office; or (3) interfere 
with the proper performance of judicial duties and are not 
incompatible with judicial office.”49 
• Section 100.5 governs the political activities of judges and 
candidates, restricting the political rights of judges who are 
not candidates for office and expanding them only when 
they are running for office.  The section also effectively 
restricts the political rights of non-judge candidates running 
 
47 22 N.Y. COMP. RULES & REGS. § 100.2(A), (C) (2020). 
48 Id. § 100.3(B)(4), (8), (E)(1)(a)(ii), (f). 
49 Id. § 100.4(A)(1)–(3).  
2020] PERMISSIBLE JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN SPEECH  87 
for judicial office: Judges and candidates for judicial office 
are not, except as permitted by the rules, allowed to engage 
in any political activity, except in connection with their own 
campaigns (as provided in this section) or on behalf of “the 
law, the legal system [and] the administration of justice.”50  
Although not explicitly stated, presumably, some “political” 
activities on behalf of the judge’s personal interests, which 
do not involve use of the judge’s office or title, are also 
permissible (as the Advisory Committee on Judicial Ethics 
opinions advise).51 
• Under section 100.5(A)(4)(a), judges and candidates are 
required to “maintain the dignity appropriate to judicial 
office and act in a manner consistent with the impartiality, 
integrity and independence of the judiciary” and under 
section 100.5(A)(4)(d), “shall not: (i) make pledges or prom-
ises of conduct in office that are inconsistent with the 
impartial performance of the adjudicative duties of the 
office; [or] (ii) with respect to cases, controversies or issues 
that are likely to come before the court, make commitments 
that are inconsistent with the impartial performance of the 
adjudicative duties of the office.”52   
• Section 100.5(A)(4)(d)(iii) prohibits judges and candidates 
from “knowingly” making “false statement[s].”53 
• Relatedly, section 100.3(E) concerns disqualification and 
generally requires disqualification where the judge’s impar-
tiality might reasonably be questioned, but more specifically 
mirrors the above provisions, requiring disqualification 
where the judge has a “bias or prejudice concerning a party” 
or has, while a judge or candidate, “made a pledge or 
promise of conduct . . . inconsistent with the impartial 
performance” of “duties” or a “public statement” committing 
 
50 Id. § 100.5(A)(1)–(2). 
51 See N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Jud. Ethics, Op. 18-164 (Dec. 11, 2018), 
https://www.nycourts.gov/ipjudicialethicsopinions/18-164.htm [https://perma.cc/57PN-
L4RL] (permitting “[a] judicial candidate who is part of a political party’s slate” to attend 
a fundraising event where the judge was a candidate); N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Jud. 
Ethics, Op. 98-99 (Sept. 10, 1998), https://www.nycourts.gov/ipjudicialethicsopinions/ 
98-99.htm [https://perma.cc/X62G-HYV4] (holding that “[a] judge may circulate . . . peti-
tions for a slate of candidates from [a] political party only if the judge’s name is also 
on the petition as a nominee”); N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Jud. Ethics, Op. 89-43 (Apr. 4, 
1989), https://www.nycourts.gov/ipjudicialethicsopinions/89-43.htm [https://perma.cc/ 
YMY3-GZY8] (allowing a town justice to serve as master of ceremonies at a 
fundraiser for an event held by the judge’s own political party). 
52 22 N.Y. COMP. RULES & REGS § 100.5(A)(4)(a), (d)(i)–(ii). 
53 Id. § 100.5(A)(4)(d)(iii). 
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“the judge with respect to . . . an issue in the proceeding” or 
“parties or controversy in the proceeding.”54 
Accordingly, judges and candidates for judicial office are re-
quired to: maintain the dignity appropriate to judicial office; act 
in a manner consistent with the impartiality, integrity, and inde-
pendence of the judiciary; refrain from making commitments 
with respect to cases, controversies, or issues that are likely to 
come before the court; and avoid political activity except for 
participating in their own campaigns as provided in the rules or 
on behalf of the law, legal system, or administration of justice.  
As demonstrated, the only significant differences between the 
treatment of judges and candidates in the rules concern the 
restrictions on judges to refrain from commenting on pending or 
impending cases in the United States and its territories and 
using the prestige of judicial office to further private interests.55 
B. Restrictions on Judges from Involvement in Public 
Controversies 
The ACJE has frequently opined that judges should not “enter 
a public controversy on a matter that goes beyond the judge’s 
strictly private interest,”56 become “associated with matters that 
 
54 Id. § 100.3(E)(1). 
55 Section 100.2 requires judges to “avoid impropriety and the appearance of 
impropriety . . . .” Id. § 100.2. Underlying this canon is the requirement that judges 
act in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of 
the judiciary. Section 100.4 requires judges to avoid activities that “cast reasonable 
doubt on the judge’s capacity to act impartially . . . .” Id. § 100.4(A)(1). Although 
there are no identically worded mandates applicable to candidates, the requirement 
of acting in a manner consistent with the impartiality and integrity of the judiciary 
is imposed on candidates by Rule 100.5. See id. § 100.5(A)(4)(d). 
56 N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Jud. Ethics, Op. 04-123 (Dec. 2, 2004), 
https://www.nycourts.gov/ipjudicialethicsopinions/04-123_.htm [https://perma.cc/AEP3-
DZAN] (“A judge should not write a letter to a public official of the county that states 
the judge’s position on a legal question growing out of the judge’s former role as a 
county legislator when the proposed letter, which is likely to become public, relates 
to a substantial political controversy; and, in addition, the controversy is likely to 
lead to litigation.”). 
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are the subject of litigation or public controversy,”57 or “insert” 
him or herself “unnecessarily into public controversy.”58 
In other opinions, the ACJE has advised against activities of 
judges that involved joining or being appointed to boards of 
organizations or 
committees that focus on “political or controversial issues,” such 
as a committee that will recommend revisions to the town code; 
local school boards; zoning or planning boards; a regional coun-




57 N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Jud. Ethics, Op. 17-70 (May 4, 2017), 
https://www.nycourts.gov/ipjudicialethicsopinions/17-70.htm [https://perma.cc/QF8T-
A7D3] (“A court attorney-referee who is an ordained rabbi may teach, preach, and 
write on Israel-related issues concerning the law, the legal system or the adminis-
tration of justice, but not on non-legal matters of substantial public and political 
controversy, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.”). 
58 N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Jud. Ethics, Op. 17-38 (Mar. 16, 2017), 
https://www.nycourts.gov/ipjudicialethicsopinions/17-38.htm [https://perma.cc/C6AB-
K789] (A judge should not participate in the march for science “unless the judge 
determines (a) the march is not co-sponsored by or affiliated with any political orga-
nization; (b) the march does not support or oppose any political party or candidate 
for election; (c) the judge’s participation will not involve the judge in impermissible 
political activity; and (d) the judge’s participation will not insert him/her un-
necessarily into public controversy.”). As alluded to above, generally, “a judge may 
publicly express . . . views on a variety of issues that affect him/her personally and 
directly, in his/her capacity ‘as a private citizen whose personal interests will be 
affected’ but must avoid public comment on controversial subjects that ‘do not 
directly affect the judge’s interests.’ ” N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Jud. Ethics, Op. 13-
178 (Dec. 12, 2013), https://www.nycourts.gov/ipjudicialethicsopinions/13-178.htm 
[https://perma.cc/GUA4-UYFJ] (first quoting N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Jud. Ethics, 
Op. 08-33 (Mar. 13, 2008), https://www.nycourts.gov/ipjudicialethicsopinions/08-
33.htm [https://perma.cc/EA2T-KRYR]; and then quoting N.Y. Advisory Comm. on 
Jud. Ethics, Op. 02-41 (June 7, 2002), https://www.nycourts.gov/ipjudicialethicsopinions/ 
02-41.htm [https://perma.cc/ HFU2-XZS7]) (“A judge who owns a home in a multi-
unit building may publicly express his/her views on a proposal by building 
maintenance employees to unionize, provided the judge does so in his/her capacity as 
a private citizen and does not use judicial stationery or otherwise refer to his/her 
judicial office.”). The rationale for the committee’s consistent approval of judges’ 
statements made as “private citizen[s]” on matters that “affect the judge’s interests” 
is not entirely clear, but it appears to derive from what has been explicitly 
prohibited by several rules. See, e.g., 22 N.Y. COMP. RULES & REGS § 100.2(C) (“A 
judge shall not lend the prestige of judicial office to advance the private inter-
ests . . . .”); Id. § 100.4(C)(1) (“A . . . judge shall not appear at public hearing . . . ex-
cept on matters concerning the law, the legal system or the administration of justice 
or except when acting pro se in a matter involving the judge or the judge’s interests.” 
(italics added)); Id. § 100.3(B)(8) (The prohibition against commenting publicly on 
pending or impending litigation “does not apply to proceedings in which the judge is 
a litigant in a personal capacity.”). Relatedly, the ancient maxim in law is that 
“everything which is not forbidden is allowed.” 
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resources; and a town’s Water Advisory Committee where there 
was a substantial likelihood that the committee would be in-
volved in matters of public controversy.59 
In Opinion 99-74, the ACJE opined that a “part-time town 
justice should not accept [an] appointment to the town’s Water 
Advisory Committee if there is a substantial likelihood that the 
committee will be involved in matters of public controversy.”60  
Likewise, in Opinion 09-56, the committee recommended that, 
although a judge could continue membership in a local chapter of 
Shooters’ Committee on Political Education, he or she could not 
serve on its board.61  Similarly, the ACJE opined that a judge 
could be a member of Planned Parenthood and the New York 
Civil Liberties Union “provided that such membership does not 
involve the judge in litigated matters or publicly associates the 
judge with organizational positions on matters of public 
controversy.”62 
More recently, in Opinion 15-188, the ACJE declined to 
reconsider prior opinions in which it advised that judges could 
not “take part in certain public activities regarding redistricting,” 
stating: 
Th[e] historical context makes clear that a judge’s publicly 
weighing in on such sharply contested and highly politicized 
issues would violate the rule barring a judge from directly or 
indirectly engaging in partisan political activity.  Legislative re-
districting is not related to “the law, the legal system or the 
administration of justice” in any conventional sense or meaning 
those terms have in the judicial ethics field or context.  To the 
contrary, redistricting is generally perceived as an exercise of 
legislative or political power.  Therefore, a judge’s voluntary 
involvement with redistricting would readily create an ap-
pearance that he/she was using the prestige of judicial office to 
 
59 N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Jud. Ethics, Op. 11-68 (June 16, 2011), 
https://www.nycourts.gov/ipjudicialethicsopinions/11-68.htm [https://perma.cc/ZH8H-
NRFF] (citations omitted). 
60 N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Jud. Ethics, Op. 99-74 (Apr. 29, 1999), 
https://www.nycourts.gov/ipjudicialethicsopinions/99-74_.htm [https://perma.cc/9SFG-
NDXA]. 
61 N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Jud. Ethics, Op. 09-56 (Mar. 12, 2009), 
https://www.nycourts.gov/ipjudicialethicsopinions/09-56.htm [https://perma.cc/QG2Y-
NH2W]. 
62 N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Jud. Ethics, Op. 98-101 (Sept. 10, 1998), 
https://www.nycourts.gov/ipjudicialethicsopinions/98-101_.htm [https://perma.cc/JV6J-
A8KP]; see also N.Y. Advisory Comm. Jud. on Ethics, Op. 98-74 (June 19, 1998), 
https://www.nycourts.gov/ipjudicialethicsopinions/98-74_.htm [https://perma.cc/4N8D-
5L6M] (judge should not serve on board of a local Right to Life organization). 
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advance the private and/or political interests of others and could 
cast reasonable doubt on the judge’s capacity to act impartially 
as a judge. 
As the Court of Appeals stated: 
litigants have a right guaranteed under the Due Process 
Clause to a fair and impartial magistrate and the State, as 
the steward of the judicial system, has the obligation to 
create such a forum and prevent corruption and the ap-
pearance of corruption, including political bias or favoritism.  
The importance of these fundamental precepts in main-
taining public confidence in the judicial system is firmly 
established: “the State has an overriding interest in the 
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary . . . ” 
These fundamental precepts firmly underlie this Commit-
tee’s continuing concern over the engagement of judges in 
partisan political issues or on matters of great public con-
troversy that are likely to raise reasonable questions about a 
judge’s ability to be fair and impartial.  This reasoning clearly 
excludes a judge from advocating for passage of a redistricting 
amendment, and from moderating or participating in a panel 
discussion concerning redistricting.  Moreover, to the extent re-
districting is primarily a legislative function, the Committee 
believes a judge’s public extra-judicial involvement in debates 
concerning redistricting could raise serious separation-of-
powers concerns.63 
In sum, in several of the above-referenced opinions, the 
ACJE recommended against making statements on one or more 
of the following bases—that the subject matter was controversial 
or likely to lead to litigation, that the statements would involve 
the judge in impermissible political activity, would raise ques-
tions about the judge’s impartiality or use the prestige of judicial 
 
63 N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Jud. Ethics, Op. 15-188, (Jan. 28, 2016), 
https://www.nycourts.gov/ipjudicialethicsopinions/15-188.htm [https://perma.cc/K95M-
FYDY] (first quoting 22 N.Y. COMP. RULES & REGS. § 100.5(A)(1)(iii); and then 
quoting In re Raab, 100 N.Y.2d 305, 313 (N.Y. 2003)); see also N.Y. COMP. RULES & 
REGS. § 100.0(S) (“An independent judiciary is one free of outside influences or 
control.”); N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Jud. Ethics, Op. 01-127 (Jan. 24, 2002), 
https://www.nycourts.gov/ipjudicialethicsopinions/01-127.htm [https://perma.cc/FMX4-
Q4T9] (noting that a town judge’s exercise of the powers and duties of the town clerk 
would “raise serious questions concerning the separation of powers and the 
independence of the judiciary”); N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Jud. Ethics, Op. 01-65 
(June 27, 2001), https://www.nycourts.gov/ipjudicialethicsopinions/01-65_.htm 
[https://perma.cc/7X9L-HEPH] (noting that it is inappropriate for a judge to be 
directly or indirectly involved in “partisan political issues” or “matters of public 
controversy”). 
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office to further private interests, or were otherwise incompatible 
with judicial office.  The opinions were issued both before and after 
the elimination of New York’s announce clause and the Supreme 
Court’s decision in White. 
As indicated, in support of the prohibition against involve-
ment in public controversy, the ACJE has relied largely on 
section 100.4(A)(3) of the Rules of the Chief Administrator of the 
Courts, which forbids extra-judicial conduct that is incompatible 
with judicial office; section 100.4(A)(1), which forbids conduct that 
casts reasonable doubt on the judge’s capacity to act impartially 
as a judge; and section 100.4(a)(2), which precludes conduct that 
detracts from judicial office.64  Although section 100.4 is by its 
terms applicable to judges only, the same essential restrictions 
are applicable to candidates as set forth in section 100.5’s 
mandates to maintain the dignity appropriate to judicial office 
and to act in a manner consistent with the impartiality, integrity, 
and independence of the judiciary.  
The point is this: the provisions that the ACJE relies upon to 
restrict judges’ speech—not rules related to political activity, but 
rules that are essentially identical to rules that are also appli-
cable to candidates where those candidates are free to announce 
their views—provide ample grounds to question some of the 
reasoning in opinions restricting the speech rights of judges.65 
V.  THE REQUIREMENT OF IMPARTIALITY IN NEW YORK 
One of the significant issues discussed in White concerns the 
meaning of impartiality.  Justice Scalia identified three possible 
definitions of impartiality and concluded that the announce 
 
64 See supra notes 55–58 and accompanying text. 
65 It does not appear to me that the voters’ “right to know,” which was 
referenced in White, can alone support differential treatment between judges and 
candidates in view of the specific wording of the rules and common sense. Republi-
can Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 862 (8th Cir. 2001), rev’d sub nom. 
Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002). The following statement of 
the argument illustrates the problem:  
• Judges cannot engage in conduct that is incompatible with judicial office. 
• Judges are barred from announcing their views on controversial issues 
because that is incompatible with judicial office. 
• The rules that apply to judges also apply to candidates, so that 
candidates, like judges, cannot engage in conduct that is incompatible 
with judicial office. 
• Candidates are free to announce their views on controversial issues, 
despite the fact that it is incompatible with judicial office, because the 
voters’ right to know is paramount. 
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clause was not narrowly tailored to advance any of them.66  He 
also appears to have adopted, in dicta, a narrow definition of 
impartiality, limited to a lack of bias for or against a party to a 
proceeding.67  In doing so, he distinguished that definition from 
“open-mindedness,” which he concluded was not the purpose for 
which the announce clause was adopted in Minnesota.68  This 
point bears further discussion as it may be possible under the 
New York Rules to announce one’s views on disputed issues in a 
way that nevertheless violates other rules, including the rules 
that mandate impartiality, which are applicable to judges and 
candidates.69 
There are fourteen references in the New York Rules 
Governing the Conduct of Judges to “impartial,” “impartially,” or 
“impartiality.”70  “Impartiality” is defined in the terminology sec-
tion of the rules as denoting the “absence of bias or prejudice in 
favor of, or against, particular parties or classes of parties, as 
well as maintaining an open mind in considering issues that may 
come before the judge,”71 which is broader than Justice Scalia’s 
definition. 
Perhaps, it is true that in many cases a judge will not have 
preconceptions on law, and it is ideal that the judge have no pre-
disposition on the merits of a case, but it is not possible in every 
conceivable case.  Moreover, it is certainly not ideal in every case 
to have a judge with no preconceptions on law; nor is it ideal to 
have a judge with moral beliefs that are entirely consistent with 
law. 
So, what does impartiality mean?  Extrapolating from the 
definition of impartiality in the New York Rules, it means, in 
addition to the lack of bias, that despite any preconceptions on 
law, or having other competing moral beliefs or principles, the 
judge can lay those aside and rule fairly and impartially.  That is, 
 
66 White, 536 U.S. at 775–78. 
67 Id. at 775–77; see also MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING 
LAWYERS’ ETHICS 246–47 (Carolina Acad. Press, 5th ed. 2016) (1990). 
68 White, 536 U.S. at 778. 
69 See FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 67, at 240–41 (“The best one can say is 
that a judge’s statement of a position on an issue will not in itself justify an 
inference of bias for or against a party. However, accompanying circumstances might 
justify an inference of bias. Such circumstances include, among others, language 
used by the judge in stating [his or her] position, whether the judge has referred to 
the specific case, and whether the statement has been addressed to a party in the 
case.”).  
70 See generally 22 N.Y. COMP. RULES & REGS §§ 100.0–.5 (2020).  
71 Id. § 100.0(R) (emphasis added). 
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the judge, in performing his or her duties impartially, follows the 
law and can be swayed by evidence and argument to a position 
contrary to what he or she preconceived.  Stated in yet another 
way, to be impartial would be to acknowledge the primacy of the 
adversarial process and the need to adhere to the law.  This is 
true whether the judge is shown that his or her preconceptions or 
beliefs are wrong, or, more, even if the judge’s preconceptions and 
beliefs are not wrong, that the principle of adherence to the law 
takes precedence.72 
With this foundation in mind, a lack of impartiality means 
that the judge not only has preconceptions of law or fact or other 
beliefs that conflict with the law, but that he or she cannot, or 
will not, lay them aside.  In short, a non-impartial judge refuses 
to accept the primacy of the adversarial process and need to 
adhere to the law when those principles come into conflict with 
the judge’s preconceptions or other beliefs. 
VI.  PLEDGES AND PROMISES, COMMITMENTS ON CASES  
LIKELY TO COME BEFORE THE COURT 
Other rules unaffected by White are restrictions on pledges 
and promises and making commitments on cases likely to come 
before the court.  As noted, these rules are applicable to judges 
and candidates.  
The specific rules, as set out in section 100.5(A) of the Rules 
of the Chief Administrator of the Courts, are that a judge or a non-
judge candidate running for election to judicial office shall not:  
(i) make pledges or promises of conduct in office that are 
inconsistent with the impartial performance of the 
adjudicative duties of the office; [or] 
(ii)  with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are 
likely to come before the court, make commitments that 
are inconsistent with the impartial performance of the 
adjudicative duties of the office.73 
VII.  ANALYZING JUDICIAL CANDIDATE ANNOUNCEMENTS 
From the foregoing, it may be concluded that when a judicial 
candidate announces his or her personal views, that does not 
necessarily indicate a lack of impartiality, meaning that the 
 
72 In the event that the judge, in a particular matter, was unable to follow the 
law owing to a moral conflict, then the judge could not continue presiding in the 
matter. 
73 Id. § 100.5(A)(4)(d). 
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judge’s preconceptions and moral beliefs would prevent the judge 
from acknowledging and accepting both the primacy of the 
adversarial process and need to adhere to the law.  Nevertheless, 
it is possible that some announcements of positions, depending 
upon content and context, and the court to which the 
candidate/judge aspires, may “cross the line” and reflect an 
impermissible bias or unchangeable position on an issue “that 
may come before the judge.”74  Moreover, some statements may 
not be curable with a disclaimer, even assuming for the sake of 
argument that the judge could be impartial in fact.  Similarly, an 
announcement of views could amount to an impermissible pledge 
or promise,75 or a commitment that is inconsistent with the 
impartial performance of duties on a case, controversy, or issue 
likely to come before the court.76 
As noted, Mr. Tembeckjian has suggested that even 
assuming an announcement is not otherwise impermissible, it 
may well give rise to a basis for later disqualification and to a 
disciplinary violation if a judge fails to disqualify himself or 
herself.77  Indeed, the ACJE specifically referenced this possibility 
in Opinion 17-28.78  Suffice it to say, the analysis of any possible 
conflict between permissible candidate announcements and the 
rules on disqualification or recusal is esoteric: significantly, 
permitting candidate announcements—only to later bar the 
successful candidate from presiding in cases because of those 
announcements—would arguably “gut” the essential holding of 
White.  Nevertheless, unable to envision or contemplate every con-
ceivable statement made by a candidate or case that might come 
before the judge, I would concede that it is at least possible that 
some permissible candidate statements could require disqual-
ification later or merit discretionary recusal.  
 
 
74 See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
75 See 22 N.Y. COMP. RULES & REGS § 100.5(A)(4)(d)(i). 
76 Id. § 100.5(A)(4)(d)(ii); see also Ind. Comm’n on Jud. Qualifications, 
Preliminary Advisory Op. 1-02 (2002), https://www.in.gov/judiciary/jud-qual/files/ 
jud-qual-adops-1-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/J9TV-SBF2] (“A statement which appears 
to constitute a mere expression of fact, such as a candidate’s reference to a record of 
imposing harsh penalties in criminal cases, may be deemed an implied promise of 
future conduct . . . .”). 
77 Tembeckjian, supra note 33. 
78 N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Jud. Ethics, Op. 17-28 (Dec. 11, 2018), 
https://www.nycourts.gov/ipjudicialethicsopinions/17-28.htm [https://perma.cc/56AC-
UMLY]. 
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A. Questions to be Considered in Analyzing Judicial Candidate 
Announcements 
In this Section, I will analyze, and offer my opinion on, vari-
ous hypothetical announcements, in order to highlight some of 
the potential problems discussed above.  To analyze specific ex-
amples of announcements, I have formulated the following 
questions, all derived from specific rules that directly or indirect-
ly affect candidate speech: 
• Does the statement, in the context in which it is made, 
indicate an unchangeable position or refusal to follow 
applicable law, on issues that may come before the judge? 
• Does the statement, in the context in which it is made, 
indicate bias or prejudice against or in favor of particular 
parties or classes of parties? 
• Does the statement, in the context in which it is made, 
contain a pledge or promise which is either express or 
implied? 
• Does the statement, in the context in which it is made, 
contain a commitment with respect to cases or controversies 
likely to come before the court? 
• Does the statement, in the context in which it is made, 
contain an express or implied commitment with respect to 
issues likely to come before the court? 
• Is the statement false? 
B. Some Hypothetical Announcements 
Below, I have categorized hypothetical statements into three 
categories: (1) Statements of Past Activities, (2) Statements of 
Present Beliefs, and (3) Prospective Statements.  Within each of 
these categories, I analyze the propriety of statements using the 
six-question analytical framework discussed above.  Hopefully, 
these specific illustrations can shed light on how impartiality 
principles may be applied in practice, and can, in turn, illustrate 
the challenges at the heart of analyzing the Right to Life Ques-
tionnaire. 
1. Statements of Past Activities 
I worked for NARAL. I participated in pro-life 
activities. 
I campaigned for pro-choice 
candidates. 
I used to picket at abortion 
clinics and went to the Right to 
Life march every January. 
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All four of these are permissible statements by a candidate 
under White and under the applicable judicial ethics rules in 
New York.  They involve past activities and result in negative 
answers to each question.  It is true that the issue of abortion is 
unlikely to come before the court, making most of the answers to 
the above questions negative.  However, even if the issue of abor-
tion may come before the court, the statements would still be 
permissible.   
Of course, the context in which the statements are made 
could be significant.  For example, if statements are made in re-
sponse to questions which ask, “What would you do in the 
future?” or “How would you decide?” or “What can we expect from 
you?”, responses such as “I can’t answer your question, however, 
I participated in pro-life activities” or “I can’t answer your ques-
tion but I campaigned only for pro-choice candidates,” could be 
problematic as they imply a promise or commitment.  In that in-
stance, a properly worded disclaimer to the effect that “I must 
follow binding precedent in all cases,” might be sufficient to cure 
the problem.  As stand-alone statements, however, they are 
permissible.  
2. Statements of Present Beliefs  
1. I am pro-abortion/pro-choice. I am pro-life. 
2. I am pro-abortion/pro-choice.  
However, I acknowledge that 
I am always required to 
follow the principle of stare 
decisis and binding 
precedent. 
I am pro-life.  However, I 
acknowledge that I am 
always required to follow the 
principle of stare decisis and 
binding precedent. 
3. I believe that the 
constitution protects choice. 
I believe that the constitution 
contains no right to abortion. 
4. I believe that the consti-
tution protects choice.  
However, I acknowledge that 
I am always required to 
follow the principle of stare 
decisis and binding 
precedent. 
I believe that the constitution 
contains no right to abortion.  
However, I acknowledge that 
I am always required to 
follow the principle of stare 
decisis and binding 
precedent. 
5. I believe that personhood 
begins at the point of 
independent viability of the 
fetus. 
I believe that personhood 
begins at conception. 
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6. I believe that personhood 
begins at the point of 
independent viability of the 
fetus.  However, I acknowl-
edge that I am always 
required to follow the 
principle of stare decisis and 
binding precedent and decide 
every case on the facts 
without regard to my 
personal opinion. 
I believe that personhood 
begins at conception.  
However, I acknowledge that 
I am always required to 
follow the principle of stare 
decisis and binding precedent 
and decide every case on the 
facts without regard to my 
personal opinion. 
 
These are all permissible statements by a candidate under 
White and under the applicable judicial ethics rules in New York. 
Although the first set of statements contains no disclaimer, 
and the second set does, both are permissible.  A disclaimer is not 
necessary, as the answer to all questions would still be negative.  
Even assuming that the issue of abortion might come before the 
court, the statements do not necessarily reflect bias or a lack of 
impartiality, as defined above.  Again, a judge can ethically have 
opinions and preconceptions on law.  
The third set of statements is also permissible, without a 
disclaimer.  This issue is unlikely to come before the court, par-
ticularly in New York state courts, and the statements contain no 
pledges or promises, nor do they show bias.  Also, even if there 
was a problem with the third set, the disclaimer in the fourth set 
would cure that issue.  
The fifth set of statements, in theory, could be implicated in 
cases unrelated to abortion, such as those involving pre-natal or 
defendants’ rights in the civil and criminal context, and, 
therefore, are more likely to come before some courts than the 
issue of abortion.  Nevertheless, they do not commit the judge to 
a position, imply a promise or pledge, or indicate an unchange-
able position or refusal to follow the law.  Although an argument 
could be made that they present a bias against “particular 
parties or classes of parties,”79 it is a very weak argument.  In 
fact, in the Tembeckjian article, he approved of a similarly 
worded statement.80  Moreover, to the extent that there might be 
 
79 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 767 (8th Cir. 2005) (en 
banc) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).  
80 Tembeckjian, supra note 33.  
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a problem with the statements, the disclaimer in the sixth set of 
statements should be sufficient to cure them.81 
3. Additional Statements of Present Beliefs 
I believe that decisions which 
placed restrictions on the right 
to choose were wrongly 
decided. 
I believe that Roe v. Wade was 
wrongly decided. 
I believe that decisions which 
placed restrictions on the right 
to choose were wrongly decid-
ed.  However, I acknowledge 
that if elected, I am required 
to follow binding precedent. 
I believe that Roe v. Wade was 
wrongly decided.  However, I 
acknowledge that if elected, I 
am required  to follow binding 
precedent. 
 
Both of the above sets of statements should be considered 
permissible under White and under the applicable judicial ethics 
rules in New York.  The disclaimer in the second set of state-
ments may be prudent but should not be necessary as the first 
statement does not indicate bias or unwillingness to follow the 
law, nor does it contain a pledge or promise.  Moreover, the issue 
of abortion is not likely to come before the courts in New York.  
4. Prospective Statements 
I would uphold a woman’s 
right to choose in all cases. 
I would strike down the so-
called right to choose and 
overturn Roe v. Wade, which 
was wrongly decided. 
I believe that no restrictions 




The first set of statements contains pledges/promises; the 
second statement arguably contains an implied promise.  I would 





81 See FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 67, at 239 (“[T]he disqualification of a 
judge in such a case could have practical consequences that could not have been 
intended . . . [given that] any judge who has expressed a position on an issue or a 
commitment to a cause could be said to have implied a bias for or against particular 
parties in such cases.”). 
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I believe that doctors who 
perform abortions are heroes 
to be honored and celebrated. 
I believe that doctors who 
perform abortions  are 
murderers. 
 
This set of statements may be problematic because they 
appear to demonstrate bias in favor of or against particular 
parties or classes of parties.  It is unlikely that a disclaimer—
even if true—would cure the problem as in the following two 
examples:  
I believe that doctors are untrustworthy.  However, I would 
treat all litigants who appear before me equally, fairly, and 
without pre-disposition. 
 
I believe that Italian-Americans are generally “mobbed up.”  
However, I would treat them equally, fairly, and impartially if 
they had matters before me.  My judicial duties come before my 
personal beliefs.82 
VIII.   THE RIGHT TO LIFE QUESTIONNAIRE83 
In considering the specific questionnaire that is the subject 
of the ACJE Opinion 17-28, it must be remembered that the 
candidate can speak on controversial issues and that there is no 
restriction against commenting on pending or impending cases.  
My analysis concerning whether the candidate can answer the 
questions is contained in the paragraphs after the answer choices.   
1.  VALUE OF EARLY HUMAN LIFE.  Recognizing the judicial 
obligation to follow binding precedents of higher courts and 
applicable constitutional and statutory provisions, to honor 
stare decisis, and to decide any future case based on the law and 
facts of that case, in accord with the position of the New York 
State Right to Life Committee, I believe that the unborn child is 
biologically human and alive and that the right to life of human 
 
82 Permissible or not? Candidate for election to the Supreme Court:  
I believe that verdicts in personal 
injury actions have tended to be 
high, however I recognize that in 
reviewing personal injury awards, 
binding precedent must be followed. 
I believe that verdicts in personal 
injury actions are obscenely high, 
however I recognize that in reviewing 
personal injury awards, binding 
precedent in this department must 
be followed. 
I would argue that the first statement is permissible. The second is problematic and 
indicates bias. It is not clear that the disclaimer is sufficient because of the 
descriptive word “obscenely.” In other words, even assuming that the judge could be 
impartial, the appearance of impartiality has been lost. 
83 Questionnaire, supra note 3. 
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beings should be respected at every stage of their biological 
development. 
____Agree ____Disagree ____Undecided ____Decline84 
 
It is my opinion that a candidate can answer this question.  
It does not concern an issue likely to come before the courts, 
makes no commitments, does not indicate an unchangeable po-
sition or refusal to follow the law on issues that may come before 
the judge, and does not reflect bias.  The use of the disclaimer is 
likely unnecessary but is sufficient to cure any problems.  
2.  LEGAL ABORTION.  The New York State Right to Life Com-
mittee believes that unborn children should be protected by law 
and that abortion should be permitted only when necessary to 
prevent the death of the mother.  Recognizing the judicial 
obligation to follow binding precedents of higher courts and 
applicable constitutional and statutory provisions, to honor 
stare decisis, and to decide any future case based on the law and 
facts of that case, state your personal view on when, if ever, 
abortion should be legal. 
a. I believe that abortion should be permitted only to 
prevent the death of the mother. 
____Agree ____Disagree ____Undecided ____Decline 
b. I believe that abortion should be permitted only to 
prevent the mother’s death, in cases of incest, and in 
reported cases of forcible rape. 
____Agree ____Disagree ____Undecided ____Decline85 
 
It is my opinion that a candidate can answer this question.  
It does not commit the candidate with respect to cases or 
controversies likely to come before the court, nor does it show 
bias or prejudice, etc.  
3.  FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO ABORTION.  In 
its 1973 ruling in Roe v. Wade, the U.S. Supreme Court found a 
“right to abortion” under the U.S. Constitution that invalidated 
the abortion statutes of all 50 states.  Recognizing the judicial 
obligation to follow binding precedents of higher-courts, and 
applicable constitutional and statutory provisions, to honor 
 
84 Id. at *1 (footnote omitted). A candidate who declines to answer is indicating 
that he or she believes in good faith that, under a reasonable construction of appli-
cable Canons of Judicial Conduct or because recusal would subsequently be necessary, 
declination is required. Id. I note that the questionnaire’s reference to required 
“recusal” is likely incorrect; it should read “disqualification.” 
85 Id. at *2 (footnotes omitted). 
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stare decisis, and to decide any future case based on the law and 
facts of that case, I believe that Roe v. Wade was wrongly 
decided.  
____Agree ____Disagree ____Undecided ____Decline86 
 
The candidate can answer this question.   
4.  STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO ABORTION.  Aside 
from the federal constitutional “right to abortion” recognized in 
Roe v. Wade, several state courts have held that there is a state 
right to abortion under their state constitutions.  Thus far, the 
courts of New York have not recognized a “right to abortion” 
under our state Constitution.  Recognizing the judicial obliga-
tion to follow binding precedents of higher courts and applicable 
constitutional and statutory provisions, to honor stare decisis, 
and to decide any future case based on the law and facts of that 
case, I believe that there is no provision in our current New York 
State Constitution which is intended to protect a right to 
abortion. 
____Agree ____Disagree ____Undecided ____Decline87 
 
In my opinion, the candidate can answer the question.  It 
contains no statement of bias or other lack of impartiality (as 
defined) and makes no commitment, pledge, or promise.  I note 
that it can be deemed a neutral, factual statement, particularly 
in view of Governor Cuomo’s call for an amendment to the state 
constitution to protect abortion rights.88  
I would add that if a statement is objectively false, then the 
candidate obviously should not make it.   
5.  STATE RIGHT TO ABORTION FUNDING.  In several deci-
sions, the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld under the U.S. Con-
stitution the decisions of federal, state, and local governments 
to prohibit the use of public funds or facilities for abortion when 
the mother’s life was not at stake.  However, several state courts 
have held under state constitutions that public funds and 
facilities must be made available to fund and facilitate abortion 
when a physician deems abortion “necessary” for any reason.  
State Supreme Courts in New Jersey and Alaska have held that 
under state law abortion must be provided in even private non-
 
86 Id. (footnote omitted) (citation omitted) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973)). 
87 Id. (footnote omitted). 
88 Press Release, New York State Governor, Governor Cuomo Proposes 
Constitutional Amendment Codifying Roe v. Wade into the New York State Constitution 
(Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-proposes-constitutional-
amendment-codifying-roe-v-wade-new-york-state [https://perma.cc/Q7ME-TFYS]. 
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religious facilities that serve the public at large or when 
abortion would otherwise be unavailable in a locale.  Recog-
nizing the judicial obligation to follow binding precedents of 
higher courts and applicable constitutional and statutory 
provisions, to honor stare decisis, and to decide any future case 
based on the law and facts of that case, I believe that there is no 
provision of our current New York State Constitution which is 
intended to require the use of public funds for abortion or to 
require that public or private health care facilities must provide 
or permit abortions on their premises. 
____Agree ____Disagree ____Undecided ____Decline89 
 
It is my opinion that the candidate can answer this question.  
Again, it contains no pledge, promise, or commitment and does 
not show bias against any party, etc.  As above, if a statement is 
objectively false, it should not be made.  
6.  STATE RIGHT TO ASSISTED SUICIDE.  In Washington v. 
Glucksberg, the U.S. Supreme Court held that there is no right 
to assisted suicide under the U.S. Constitution.  In a companion 
case, Vacco v. Quill, the Supreme Court also held that equal 
protection of law under U.S. Constitution was not violated by a 
ban on physician[-]assisted suicide for the terminally ill, 
although the law permits life-sustaining treatment to be 
withheld or withdrawn from the terminally ill.  The state 
Supreme Courts of Florida and Alaska have held that their 
state constitutions do not protect a right to assisted suicide.  
Recognizing the judicial obligation to follow binding precedents 
of higher courts and applicable constitutional and statutory 
provisions, to honor stare decisis, and to decide any future case 
based on the law and facts of that case, I believe that there is no 
provision of our current New York State Constitution which is 
intended to protect a right to assisted suicide. 
____Agree ____Disagree ____Undecided ____Decline90 
 
The candidate can answer this question affirmatively.  I note 
that the question was undoubtedly drafted prior to the Court of 
Appeals’ decision in Myers v. Schneiderman, wherein the court 
held that there was no constitutional right to “aid-in-dying.”91  
Thus, an affirmative answer is consistent with the law.  A negative 
 
89 Questionnaire, supra note 3, at *3 (footnote omitted). 
90 Id. (footnote omitted) (citations omitted) (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 
521 U.S. 702 (1997); Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997)). 
91 30 N.Y.3d 1, 13 (N.Y. 2017). 
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answer to this question is problematic because of the absence of 
any reference to Myers. 
Hypothetically, depending upon the wording of the question, 
a candidate should be able to express disagreement with existing 
law (as discussed infra) provided there is no indication of a 
willingness to not follow the law.  For example, I have had oc-
casion to express to my New York Civil Practice students my 
intense dislike of Curry v. MacKenzie, in which Judge Cardozo 
first articulated the unpleaded defense rule, and the impact of 
that case on the quality of pleadings in New York.92  Yet, I am, 
always and ever, bound to follow its mandate. 
As above, of course, if a statement is objectively false, it 
should not be made.  
7.  DISPOSITION OF HUMAN BEINGS IN VITRO.  Recog-
nizing the judicial obligation to follow binding precedents of 
higher courts and applicable constitutional and statutory provi-
sions, to honor stare decisis, and to decide any future case based 
on the law and facts of that case, I believe in accord with the 
position of the New York State Right to Life Committee, that 
human beings whose lives begin by in vitro fertilization or 
cloning and who exist outside the body of a woman are not 
personal property and should be treated in accord with their best 
interests in any dispute over their disposition. 
____Agree ____Disagree ____Undecided ____Decline93 
 
In my opinion, the candidate can answer this question.  
Assuming that the law treats fetuses as property, then a negative 
answer is consistent with the law and is permissible.  An affir-
mative response, at first glance, appears to present a closer 
question, but again I believe it is permissible.  I note that in this 
question, as in the eighth and ninth questions, use of the word 
“should” does not indicate that the candidate, as judge, will rule 
in contravention of law.  In this regard, an affirmative response 
can be recast as follows: “Recognizing the judicial obligation to 
follow the law, which says that fetuses are to be treated as 
personal property in any dispute over their disposition, I believe 
that fetuses should not be treated as personal property in any 
dispute over their disposition.”  This statement does not contain 
a pledge or promise, nor does it suggest that the candidate will 
 
92 239 N.Y. 267, 269–70 (N.Y. 1925). 
93 Questionnaire, supra note 3, at *3 (footnote omitted). 
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not follow the law.  It is statement of disagreement with the law, 
which is permissible.  
8.  WRONGFUL LIFE.  Suits have been brought in several states 
by infants born with disabilities through their parents, claiming 
that those responsible for maternal health care during 
pregnancy are financially liable for their “wrongful lives” 
because their mothers were not afforded the opportunity to 
abort them by being told that they would be born with a 
disability.  Recognizing the judicial obligation to follow binding 
precedents of higher courts and applicable constitutional and 
statutory provisions, to honor stare decisis, and to decide any 
future case based on the law and facts of that case, I do not 
believe that a person should be able to sue another because he or 
she was born alive with a disability rather than aborted. 
____Agree ____Disagree ____Undecided ____Decline94 
 
The candidate can answer this question.  If the answer is af-
firmative, the candidate is agreeing with established New York 
law that does not recognize wrongful life causes of action.95  If the 
candidate answers negatively, that is nothing more than 
expressing disagreement with the law as it exists.  In this regard, 
a negative response can be recast as follows: “Recognizing the 
judicial obligation to follow the law, which does not recognize 
lawsuits based on wrongful life, I believe that the law should 
recognize lawsuits based on wrongful life.”  This statement con-
tains no pledge or promise or commitment, etc., and the 
disclaimer is sufficient to ameliorate any potential problem with 
its utterance.   
9.  WRONGFUL BIRTH.  Suits have been brought in several 
states by parents of children born with disabilities against 
maternal health care providers for the care and upkeep of their 
disabled children because the mothers were not provided the 
opportunity to have their unborn children tested for disabilities 
so that a “wrongful birth” could have been avoided by aborting 
any disabled child.  Recognizing the judicial obligation to follow 
binding precedents of higher courts and applicable constitu-
tional and statutory provisions, to honor stare decisis, and to 
decide any future case based on the law and facts of that case, I  
 
 
94 Id. at *4 (footnote omitted). 
95 See, e.g., Alquijay v. St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 63 N.Y.2d 978, 979 (N.Y. 
1984). 
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do not believe that parents should be able to sue another because 
their child was born alive with a disability rather than aborted. 
____Agree ____Disagree ____Undecided ____Decline96 
 
The candidate can answer the question.  As wrongful birth is 
a cognizable claim in New York,97 a negative answer is a state-
ment consistent with the law as it exists.  An affirmative answer 
is a disagreement with the law, which contains no pledge or 
promise or commitment, etc.  In this regard, an affirmative re-
sponse can be recast as follows: “Recognizing the judicial 
obligation to follow the law, which permits wrongful birth 
lawsuits, I believe that the law should not permit wrongful birth 
lawsuits.  It is a permissible statement.” 
CONCLUSION 
In view of New York’s elimination of the announce clause 
and the Supreme Court’s opinion in White, and upon a review of 
the applicable judicial canons and rules as well as the com-
mission determinations, committee opinions, and scholarly 
commentary, it is my opinion that judicial candidates should be 
allowed to answer the Right to Life Questionnaire.  I strongly 
disagree with Advisory Committee on Judicial Ethics Opinion 17-
28, in which the Committee opined that judges could not ethically 
answer the questionnaire.  I believe that the opinion serves to 
undermine the holding of White, which greatly expanded the 
speech rights of judicial candidates.  That said, and despite my 
strong disagreement with the Opinion, I will follow its 
proscription as I feel ethically obliged to do. 
 
 
96 Questionnaire, supra note 3, at *4 (footnote omitted). 
97 See, e.g., Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 410, 412–13 (N.Y. 1978). 
